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Abstract  
More often than not, intolerance is extremely rejected in favour of 
tolerance simply because of the belief that the latter produces a 
better chance of inter-personal relationship in a pluralistic society. In 
this sense tolerance will mean to allow others to practise their 
religious belief without hindrance. While the term ‘allow’ carries a 
legal import i.e. authorisation, toleration means only the absence of 
objection rather than genuine approval of another’s religious belief. 
It is therefore the argument of this paper that tolerance already 
divides between the powerful and the less-powerful, the privileged 
and the less-privileged. It is this inherent weakness in tolerance that 
makes the paper to insist on frank dialogue; truth-meeting-truth. 
 
Introduction  
Since our views of the future plays a significant role 
in our attitudes towards the immediate future, it is 
essential to ask whose view of reality is most 
accurate. When we fail to formulate concrete ideas, 
we leave the field to sects... who bank on their 
special eschatological system. In fact, once you 
understand their eschatology, you understand their 
doctrines.... we must find definite answers to such 
movements, even though we need to tolerate a 




Thomas Schirrmacher’s thesis above speaks volume about tolerance. 
Certain delineations need to be made quickly in order to underscore 
what tolerance could possibly mean. First, emphasis is placed on 
asking, which for us, implies interrogation. An act of interrogation 
necessarily means that there is an interrogator and the interrogated. 
This being so, we concede that there is the concept of authority upon 
which he/she exercises power over the interrogated. Authority in 
loose conceptualisation defines some legal backing, a grundnorm 
upon which both parties depend to make their claims. But whether 
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the grundnormis essentially agreeable to both is a matter for 
intellectual adjudication, but also more importantly, a practical 
problem. 
The ‘asking’ also conveys the impression that the two 
competing views are in constant struggle to either eliminate the other 
or subsist and survive the crucibles foisted on it by the other. The 
leitmotif of the two views is ultimate reality defined from the prisms 
of the competing forces of the parties; it is a struggle to find whose 
view of the reality is “most accurate.” In this process, we must admit 
that there are ordinarily three levels of reality: positive, comparative 
and superlative. As soon as a reality crosses from positive to 
comparative, there naturally begins a struggle to attain the 
superlative in a plural set up. Whether anyone will accept his/her 
reality to be conceived in less than the superlative in the context and 
contest of existential and eschatological (ultimate) struggle remains 
arguable. As Schirrmacher seems to portray, the comparative level 
of engagement is a critical stage of ascertaining the veracity or 
otherwise of other people’s claims as well as one’s. It is this stage 
that the chaff is sifted from the wheat, while the wheat is tolerated, 
the chaff is thrown away. This comparative stage is also relational 
on the basis of the tenor of individuals’ beliefs being tested against 
some set principles. Hence the superiorisation and inferiorisation of 
values, doctrines and beliefs, which have been the thrust of 
tolerance, cannot be easily ruled out. But it is instructive that we 
appreciate that the dialectics of tolerance, especially religious 
tolerance (at both intra and inter levels) is complex and problematic. 
Again, we come frontally with a separatist view of reality: 
Schirrmacher’s point is that those who belong to a certain faith 
group are in a special class whose concept and view of reality and 
the future should form the basis of relation with those outside the 
group. This immediately conveys a sense of authority and grand 
superiority that evokes the spasm of reactions. Whose view of the 
future can truly be defined as authentic? What are the objective 
criteria to determine its authenticity? Who sets the criteria in the first 
instance? How acceptable are the criteria to others outside one’s 
group? How do we reconcile discrepancies inherent in different sets 
of criteria by different faith groups in intra- and inter- religious 
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relations in a pluralist setting? Is there any need of setting criteria at 
all if we are not sure of objective principles? Finally, can all the 
views of the future be truly authentic in a plural setting? 
Consequently, this article interrogates the dialectic of the 
theory and praxis of tolerance, which resonate from the question of 
tolerance and the concept of tolerance. In this case, it is important 
for us to understand tolerance and why it is also usually being 
recommended as a sure way from violence that results from 
intolerance. In so doing, it is argued that tolerance is not enough 
because of the inherent problematique. Thus a focused, and 
modicum of dialogue is advocated, which in itself should be able to 
overcome the consequences of dialogueritis, but one that calls for 
greater frank and candid involvement in a pluralist society. 
 
The Concept of Tolerance 
The concept of religious tolerance at both intra- and inter- levels 
presupposes that there are various religious claims in the 
marketplace. It also predisposes that the context is pluralistic, which 
generally should stimulate equal rights, acceptance, accommodation, 
a live and let live situation despite the competitive forces of 
doctrines for the superlative. Within this context, “true tolerance (as 
a virtue, aligned with other virtues such as humility, respect and 
courtesy), by which each person or group of persons is entitled to 
defend his or her understanding of what is good for human beings by 
rational arguments, and to attempt to persuade others that it is, in 
fact, true,” is further predicated “within a non-hierarchical 
framework of equality and non-discrimination.”
2
According to 
Gustav Mensching, “by tolerance, we mean — formally speaking — 
religious freedom granted the individual to choose and to practice as 
he wishes.” Formal tolerance will therefore imply that everyone 
within a system is reasonably free to pursue his/her religious belief 
without interference. As such, the state is neutral about religion in 
relation to articles 2 and 18 of the 1948 United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth Declaration).
3
 
Shaun A de Freitas’ and Gustav Mensching’s active 
meaning of tolerance may not underscore the whole gamut of what 
tolerance is. Jane Smith has shown that some conceptions of 
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tolerance may be fairly passive. She examined its Latin etymology 
anglicized as tolerance to mean “to bear,” “to suffer,” to “endure.”
4
 
The leitmotif of “bearing a burden” as argued by Louis Hammann, 
points to the fact that human beings are being tolerated by God, as in 
“picking up and carrying” them. As such human beings should be 
able to tolerate one another as does God. Against the general belief 
that this may be a sign of passivity, Smith argues that “tolerance as 
suffering or enduring” carries a weight of active, though difficult 
response. To understand tolerance as “to put up with” or “to permit” 
as some scholars have argued, means that there is a disconnect 
between “tolerance and pain,” which inherently goes contrary to its 
etymology. While tolerance in this context has to do with suffering, 
“toleration is not indifference, and cannot be insofar as indifference 
suggests lack of conviction.”
5
 This will mean that the degree of 
one’s commitment to a religious belief is equal to the degree of 
suffering or pain one has to bear or tolerate.  
Newman’s distinction is apposite, according to which, 
toleration involves a broad spectrum: openness, application and also 
suggestive of passivity. Tolerance, on the other hand, is “a 
behavioral term, suggesting a response of activity in the concrete 
actions in which such openness is demonstrated.” Newman sees 
toleration as a problem for dictatorial system whereas tolerance is “a 
difficult and painful business.”
6
 “Toleration,” EberhardTroeger 
argues, “is defined by laws and the courts.”
7
 Given this, we can say 
that toleration, though not neatly separated from tolerance, has legal 
tone, which is enforceable by one over the other. 
Understood from the Western perspective, tolerance comes 
to assume the position of toleration, which means “permission or 
concession in relation to religious freedom.”
8
 Toleration is more 
perspectival here, where it carries the weight of “permission” that 
does not necessarily imply “approval.” MiroljubJevtic argued that 
even the Western conceptualisation of toleration is derived from 
Christianity rather than secular ideology. According to him, 
“consider toleration, for example, a civic virtue many today view as 
an offspring of secularism but whose absolutist roots are in 
Christianity and imbued in the very fate of Jesus.”
9
  Western 
countries did not only incorporate it into “their legal codex but also 
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into cultural mores of everyday behavior.”
10
 Really, Jevtic appears to 
interchange tolerance and toleration as many scholars do. This has 
created and continues to create confusion in tolerance discourse.  
Tim Downs sees tolerance as glue that holds together the 
mosaic from disintegrating, but yet implies “sympathy and 
indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with 
one’s own.”
11
 The fact being maintained is that one may not agree 
with another’s religious views but indulge them. One can distinguish 
between negative and positive tolerance. The former being that one 
can understand another’s religious beliefs and practices without 
sharing or accepting them whereas the latter, which modern 
pluralism apparently endorses means, in addition to understanding 
another’s religious beliefs, one should also “accept them as equally 
valid approaches to life.”
12
 
The idea of positive tolerance being linked with validity is 
critical in some sense. The concept of validity as underscored is 
limited to those who adhere to a certain belief rather than those who 
are enjoined to regard it as valid. For instance, the Christians hold 
that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the world especially those who 
turn to him in faith. The validity of this doctrine rests indubitably on 
the Bible, defined as infallible and inerrant. However, the Muslims 
hold that Jesus Christ was just a prophet of God at best; a belief also 
entrenched in an infallible and inerrant scripture, the Qur’an. How 
does positive tolerance take place here? Tolerance for the Muslims 
will be that Jesus Christ the Saviour is limited to Christians and valid 
for them only. And that Jesus Christ as prophet is limited to Muslims 
and valid for them only. This, from the prisms of the Bible and 
Qur’an, will mean two different personalities of Jesus Christ that are 
difficult to relate with each other squarely. If this ends at the level of 
religious intellectualism, an intolerant situation may not be enacted, 
but a negative tolerance has been created. But this form of 
intellectualism contravenes the realities both believe Jesus Christ 
represents for them. The denial of either of the statements is 
considered prejudicial by one just as the other views it as 
invalidating his/her belief, and again just as its relative conception 
will impact adversely on the other’s belief. 
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Within the principle of tolerance, the problem of relativism 
and absolutism, according to which, the former gears towards 
tolerance and the latter dogmatism and judgementalism cannot be 
ignored. In the classical perception of the principle of tolerance, a 
person holds his religious or moral views exclusively as true while 
regarding opposing others are false. But he/she has respect for the 
person of the opponent and his/her rights to hold his/her views. 
Crisply put, one respects the person of the opponent, not his/her 
views or ideas of reality. Moreland and Craig evaluate this position 
to be absolutist because of its inconsistency with “normative and 
meta-ethical relativism and ethical skepticism.”
13
 The modern sense 
of the principle of tolerance does not allow a person to pass value 
judgment on another’s religious or moral view. But linking this with 
cultural relativism is problematic for the reason that there are 
different religions and cultures with differing ethical judgments. In 
its normative sense, being tolerant or intolerant depends on one’s 
social [or religious] code. Examining the combinatorial relativism, 
which rejects moral judgment on another’s “freely chosen 
understanding of the good life” or religious view, Moreland and 
Craig conclude that combinatorial relativism “is a vice and not a 
virtue” thus making the various forms of relativism problematic for 
the understanding of religious tolerance.
14
 That’s why Smith points 
out that,  
 
Newman argues that in one way the relativist is 
actually a critic of tolerance rather than a defender, 
insofar as that person by definition sees religious 
tolerance as a vestige of an absolutist understanding 
of religion. There is no reason not to be open to the 
beliefs of others when it is arguable that no one 
belief is substantially more true than that of another.  
If one subscribes to this argument, it would mean 
that those who hold a theologically “pluralist” 
position (setting aside the substantial arguments 
against the still popular tripartite categorization of 
theological positions vis-à-vis pluralism), seemingly 
more tolerant than the proposed “exclusivists” or 
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It appears that both classical and modern versions of 
tolerance are operative within legal frameworks that guarantee 
competing religious views to be accommodated. The equality 
envisaged and canvassed is not only theoretical but applicative and 
attainable by all. As Peter Hahne expounded, “tolerance is not a 
question of knowledge, conscience or deep personal convictions but 
is rooted in human dignity. We can have different opinions yet 
accept the other person as individual. Tolerance and love are two 
sides of the same coin.”
16
 The challenge this argument throws up is 
that the state has the responsibility of fostering genuine tolerance by 
being completely religiously neutral, thus providing a level 
playground for all religions. For the individuals, it is required that 
they should reciprocate the act of tolerance shown them by others. 
Mutuality of tolerance does not necessarily imply that one is weak or 
stupid as some have suggested, but that others are allowed to pursue 
without let what is religiously valid to them, because as the Chinese 
would say, “tolerant men are never stupid and stupid men are never 
tolerant.”
17
 One only hopes that the normative import of this is 
accepted by those who are religiously intolerant! 
 
The Paradox of Tolerance 
In this section, we review some literature on contemporary 
state of tolerance in different places to show that its praxis is 
problematic as well. The various legal instruments demonstrate the 




 of the 
Declaration explicitly guarantee religious liberty and freedom to 
change one’s religion without let. Glenn Penner however identified 
that sharia concept is the most problematic challenge to the 
realisation of the Declaration globally. According to him, in any 
country or region where sharia is adopted as law, the idea of 
religious freedom automatically becomes difficult to observe and 
exercise. Even though there can be some scanty exceptions like 
Indonesia, it has been found that “the legislative process is at present 
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strongly influenced by a conservative Islamic agenda.”
20
 He further 
asserts: 
 
Not only did persecution begin because of religious 
intolerance, but it also took place in the home. Just 
as it divided the first family, loyalty to God often 
cuts families asunder. Let us not be surprised when 
in today’s world we hear of, for example, young 
girls in Pakistan and India being shot to death by 
their relatives when they convert to Christ. I have 
met young teenagers in Ethiopia being driven from 
their homes into the streets to beg when they 
become believers. We are heartbroken when we 
discover that girls who have come to Christ in 
Muslim societies are sometimes forced by their 
fathers to marry Muslim men to guarantee that her 




Thomas Schirrmacher and Kathleen McCall also argue that even 
though constitutions of many Islamic countries make provisions for 
religious freedom as a fundamental human right, conversion to 
another religion still attracts capital punishment whereas Muslims 
are free to proselytise. In many of these countries (Morocco, 
Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc), Christians and Jews do 
not enjoy equal rights with their Muslim counterparts. The former 
are regarded as “second-class citizens” who must be “only tolerated 
and supervised” because “a Moslem citizen cannot be expected to 
endure and continually resist the missionary activity of other 
religions.”
22
 Christine Schirrmacher argues that “tolerance is not 
used here in the sense of a recognition based on equal rights, but 
rather in the sense of the toleration of an inferior.”
23
 For the tolerated 
Jews and Christians, peace means being condoned as “wards” with 
inferior social, political, legal and economic status. As such they are 
constantly reminded that they can only attain full citizenship on the 
basis of conversion to Islam. Peace is not predicated on relationship 
of equality; as it seems, equality is a product of conversion, whose 
result may be peace.
24
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EberhardTroeger takes a historical excursus into the Islamic 
concept of tolerance towards Christians and Jews. Although Prophet 
Muhammad initially believed that his religion and those of the Jews 
and Christians were essentially agreeable, his rejection by the latter 
laid the foundation for disagreement, which led to their being 
regarded as “unbelievers.” Consequently, they were treated as 
dhimmis, “protected people,” who though were allowed to keep their 
faith, yet had to pay poll tax. As such they enjoyed far less rights 
than Muslims, and were only tolerated.
25
 Ergun and Emir Caner 
argue that even though caliph Umar was regarded as a very tolerant 
man, he indeed restricted Christianity and Judaism. Umar’s protocol 
of protection for Christians read inter alia: 
 
The protection is for their lives and properties, their 
churches and crosses, their sick and healthy and for 
all their co-religionists. Their churches shall not be 
used for habitation, nor shall they be demolished, 
nor shall injury be done to them or to their 
compounds, or to their crosses, nor shall their 
properties be injured in any way. There shall be no 
compulsion for these people in the matter of 





The Umar’s law of mercy can be compared with his Pact with 
Christians, according to which, they 
 
shall not build, in our cities or in their 
neighborhood, new monasteries, Churches, 
convents, or monks’ cells, nor shall [they] repair, 
by day or by night, such of them as fall in ruins or 
are situated in the quarters of the Muslims;                                                                                 
shall not manifest religion publicly nor convert 
anyone to it…. [Christians] shall not prevent any of 
[their] kin from entering Islam if they wish;                                                                                
shall show respect toward the Muslims, and shall 
rise from seats when [Muslims] wish to sit”; “shall 
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not display crosses or books in the roads or markets 





These have continued to guide the relationship between 
Christians and Muslims even in the 21
st
 century as they are being 
interpreted and re-interpreted, especially by the radical Islamic sects. 
Turkey has strict laws against other religions. As BehnanKonutgan 
observes, “to be a Turk, means to be a Muslim. Other religions are 
not accepted and tolerated.”
28
 Even though Saudi Arabia claims to 
be religiously liberal, in practice it does not tolerate other religions. 
A US report says that  
 
Freedom of religion does not exist. Islam is the 
official religion and all citizens must be Muslims. 
The Government prohibits the public practice of 
other religions. Private worship by non-Muslims is 
permitted. … Under Shari'a (Islamic law), upon 
which the Government bases its jurisprudence, 
conversion by a Muslim to another religion is 
considered apostasy. Public apostasy is a crime 




In Sri Lanka, non-Buddhists are not really tolerated. Article 
IX of the 1978 constitution regards Buddhism as “the foremost 
place” and empowers the state to “protect and foster” it. Although 
this runs contrary to Article X which grants every citizen the 
freedom to adopt and manifest publicly or privately the religion of 
their choice, the stark reality however is that government does not 
only legally discriminate against non-Buddhists, but also tolerates 
violence against religious minorities. In a celebrated case in summer 
2003 when a group of Catholic nuns sought legal incorporation for 
their religious order to provide educational and other social services 
within their faith, the Supreme Court held that “the constitution does 
not recognize a fundamental right to propagate a religion” and that 
“the propagation of and spreading of Christianity … would impair 
the very existence of Buddhism” as the protected religion. Even 
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when the nuns appealed to the UN, which interpreted it as a 
violation of the international law, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court 
ruled that the UN’s decision in contra to its constitution has no 
binding authority on the country.
30
 
 Iran believes that modern conceptualisation of racism is not 
based on inequality between races, but on culture, nationality and 
religion, a position the US rejects on the basis of the fact of 
distinction between racism and religion.
31
 Article 12 of the Iranian 
constitution recognises Jews, Christians and Zoroastrian Iranians as 
religious minorities. However, Baha’i (founded by Baha’u’llah in 
Teheran in the middle of the 19
th
 century) does not enjoy the status 
of the dhimmis. This is because Muslims regard Muhammad as the 
last prophet, thus putting Baha’i faith outside the pale of 
protection.
32
 To be sure, this question of tolerance resonates between 
Christians and Muslims, namely that the Muslims accepted the 
Jewish and Christian religions whereas they reject Islam. The 
argument of Jews and Christians is simply because they believe their 
revelations had been completed before the rise of Islam; argument 
Muslim apologists do not accept to be valid, and now could not be 
extended to the Baha’i either.
33
 The same thing can be said to have 
happened between Jews and Christians. The Jews reject Jesus as the 
Messiah, which the Christians accept as the fulfilment of the Old 
Testament as a whole.  
 The idea of new conceptualisation of racism defined in 
terms of religion is instructive even though the US may disagree. 
One illustration will clarify this. The Danish cartoon saga (in which 
Muhammad wears a bomb-shaped turban, and another shows him as 
an assassin) raised a lot of dust in the Muslim world. The cartoon 
was viewed as insulting the prophet of Islam, which verdict was 
death. According to Abdul Aziz IbnBaz, the most respected 
authority and vociferous Saudi Islamic theologian,  
 
Different sources tell us that whoever insults Allah’s 
prophet (Muhammad) or abuses his name must be 
killed …. All Muslim theologians and groups – like 
al-Shafi’I [the father of Islamic jurisprudence], 
Malik [a jurist of the early Islamic times] etc. – 
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agree on the opinion that whoever insults Allah’s 
prophet must be killed. And: Insulting Muhammad 
can have different forms ... whoever compares 
Allah’s prophet with an animal is an outlaw and an 





 However, there was no single protest over a cartoon 
published by an Egyptian newspaper, Saut al-Masa where “the 
Egyptian cartoonist has drawn a picture of a cock with a human head 
and has given it the subtitle: ‘This is Muhammad, my Lord, who was 
married to nine wifes’ (sic). ... This is a clear allusion to Allah’s 
prophet ....”
35
 It is argued that since the cartoon was published by a 
Muslim in a Muslim newspaper in a Muslim country, it is tolerable, 
but if it had been in the West or elsewhere, there would have been 
massive protests. The same can be said about the desecration and 
destruction of the tombs of the Muslims saints in Timbuktoo, 
particularly the mausoleum of the Imam Moussa al-Khadin, which 
for long has become “a world heritage under the protection of 
UNESCO and accorded pride of place in African patrimony.”
36
 
 Again, the US ambassador to Libya,Ambassador J. 
Christopher Stevens and three others were killed on the reason that 
some Americans released an obscure film that portrayed Prophet 
Muhammad in bad light. This film was reported to have been 
written, produced and directed by NakoulaBasseleyNakoula, an 
Egyptian-American Coptic Christian.
37
Sam Bacile also claimed 
authorship and added that it was sponsored by some Jewish business 
men. The controversies trailing the film have made it hard to trace 
the makers.
38
The question of tolerance here does not have anything 
to do with the producer of the film who, as has been shown earlier, 
does not represent the spirit of tolerance preached by his faith, but 
more crucially on the killing of innocent people, who might not have 
been related in any way with the producer. Such other acts as those 
of Pastor Terry Jones, accused of burning a copy of the Qur’an in 
Florida in 2010, Salmon Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1989, the 
Danish cartoon saga in 2005, the call for deportation of all Muslims 
from Europe, the Crusades (1095-1291), which has been termed 
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“Christian Jihad,” a retaliatory act provoked by the killing of about 
7000 Christians on the way to worship in Jerusalem, etc. raised 
critical questions of tolerance in Christianity as well.
39
 
The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) has repeatedly made 
it known that Islam is unique and should be isolated from Western 
intolerance.
40
 The evolution of “Universal Islamic Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1981,” “1990 Cairo Declaration of Human 
Rights,” and “Arab Charter on Human Rights” of 15 September 
1994, is a step towards vitiating the 1948 Declaration, which some 
Islamic countries believe should be revised. These Islamic 
Declarations theoretically hold the equality of all human beings, but 
specific provisions and conditions for enjoying them show that they 
are Islam-prone. All of them believe that sharia is exclusively the 
basis of enjoying them despite the fact that they widely acclaim that 
“there is no compulsion in religion.”
41
 This, Hans-Peter Raddatz, 
called “Shariatising,” that is, “a movement pushing for existing 
legislation of the Sharia.”
42
 In addition, the hadiths also in many 




Tolerance and Theological Fault Lines 
For some time now, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
has been advocating the enforcement of an international law against 
defamation of religion. It argues that not only Islam should be 
isolated from defamation, but all world religions. This is because 
religion is not only sensitive, but also reaches the core of human 
existence. This call has deep theological issues that need to be 
handled with total commitment without also compromising the 
integrity one’s faith. As shown earlier, the histories of the 
development of revelations as contained in the sacred texts of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam do not allow for superimposition of 
extempore revelation. Each revelation is believed to be complete on 
its own as well as independent of one another to a large extent 
except for Christianity that believes it fulfils the Old Testament. 
That being the case, the irreconcilable texts should be viewed with 
utmost caution especially on the basis of historical development. We 
illustrate this point with a few examples. 
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 Responding to the OIC advocacy for the observance of a 
global law of defamation of religion, Raymond Ibrahim emphasises 
the theological task and challenge before the Muslims. According to 
him, if by defamation is meant “to blacken another’s reputation” and 
“false or unjustified injury of a good reputation of another,” it will 
mean that such a law will ban the existence of Islam. Defamation, to 
Muslims, means anything that insults or repudiates Islam or offends 
the sensitivity of Muslims. If this law is implemented, he maintains, 
it will mean that the OIC has agreed that slanderers on another’s 
religion should be banned. “What, then, do we do with Islam’s core 
religious texts – beginning with the Qur’an itself, which slanders, 
denigrates and blackens the reputation of other religions?” To be 
sure, Surah 5: 73 refers to Christians as infidels because of their 
belief in the Trinity while Surah 9: 30 curses them for upholding the 
belief that Christ is the Son of God, whereas Allah is not begotten 
nor does he beget. Some hadiths regard the cross worn by Christians 
as idolatry. How would the Catholic Christians manage the religious 
sensitivity provoked by an authoritative Qur’anic exegete, IbnKathir 
who posits that Muhammad in paradise is married to, and enjoying 
sex with, Virgin Mary?
44
 
The idea of Jesus Christ being the “herald of Islam” or “a 
precursor to Mohammad” and that he is being falsely worshipped 
since he is not a saviour will have to be interrogated. To be sure, the 
disciples of Jesus Christ have been accused of promoting the 
worship of Jesus in order to distort his “originally Islamic” message. 
This makes Christian revelation as contained in the Bible a “falsified 
text,” which should be redacted in light of the Qur’an.
45
 The denial 
of Christ’s crucifixion (Qur’an 4: 157), the apostleship of Jesus 
rather than the saviour (Qur’an 4: 171), the creation of Jesus in 
opposition to his eternity (Qur’an 3: 59), etc. are theological areas 
that tolerance, even in its positive sense may not be able to resolve, 
particularly when upholding the inalterability, infallibility and 
inerrancy of the Qur’an.
46
 Several Muslim publications have 




Unfortunately, these theological grey areas have assumed 
widespread political platform and ‘religious racism.’ When a non-
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Muslim does anything interpreted as offensive to Islam, it is 
generally held that Christians are responsible. The West has been 
christened Christian despite the fact that Christians argue that the 
West itself is undermining their faith with avid pursuit of secularism 
and post-Christianity. Ergun and Emir Caner write: “Europe is not 
Christian, and no society any more diverse in religion than that in 
North American.”
48
 In the West, for instance, a lot of writings 
against Christianity have been had, and still being published, apart 
from those from the Arab world. The supposed marriage of Jesus by 
Harvard Divinity School professor Karen L. King’s The Gospel of 
Jesus’ Wife, Dan Brown's novel The Da Vinci Code, among other 
controversial opinions even about the historicity of Jesus Christ do 
not readily result in physical violence in contemporary society. 
The same idea is replicated in Nigeria. Most southerners are 
perceptively linked to the West and most northerners Arab.
49
 For 
example, concerning the film mentioned above in which US 
Ambassador and three others were killed, the leader of Islamic 
Movement in Nigeria Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky describes the 
Goodluck Jonathan’s government as stooge of America that only 
carries out the commands of the West. According to him, 
 
Our message to the stooges of America is that our 
protest shall surely take place. So, the blood thirsty 
stooges who serve American interest shall have the 
chance to kill. We are ready to die for the Prophet, 
and we want you to show that you are enemies of 
Prophet by killing his lovers. Our common slogan is 
“LibbykaRasulallah.” This is the symbol of unity, so 
all Muslims shall express their concern with us. One 




These are really strong mobilising words, calling out Muslims in 
Nigeria to fight against innocuous Christians (tagged enemies) who 
do not know or gain from the contentious movie. One only hoped 
that more lives would not be lost in addition to the devastation being 
currently experienced from the Islamic sect called Boko Haram – 
education is evil! Wole Soyinka observes that such protests are 
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“largely directed against the innocent, since the originating hand is 
usually, in any case, beyond reach.”
51
 
The fore-going naturally leads to the question whether 
tolerance is enough. Edward Hulmes forcefully answers that 
“tolerance and understanding are insufficient even when elevated 
and institutionalized into an ideological commitment.”
52
 Can one be 
tolerant with an intolerant other?
53
 May be tolerance expresses 
weakness and resignation of the intolerant or perhaps it is 
completely absurd.
54
 This is because tolerance has been understood 
thus far in three principal ways: dialectic of master-slave in which 
one superintends and another subordinated, i.e. perquisite; fanciful 
ideology, which is skewed and suspicious; and expression of 
impatience and irrationality, which exudes violence. As such 





The Possibilities of Dialogue 
It has been suggested that the obvious shortcomings of tolerance 
have intensified the need for dialogue.
56
 But it is also being observed 
that dialogue is becoming abused because of distortion of its 
meaning, scope and prerequisites. Dialogue has been equated with 
meetings, debates and negotiations, especially in Nigeria where 
inter-religious conflict is commonplace. Some have made it assume 
a simplistic posture such that its supposed regularity is confused 
with its less effect on society.
57
 This is why the wise counsel that 
“dialogue should not mutate into a “dialogueritis,” [i.e.] an illness 
described as suffering from too much dialogue at a time” should be 
urgently taken into consideration.
58
 However, to overcome the 
problematique of tolerance and dialogueritis, Soyinka suggests that 
“there must be dialogue of frank, mature minds. Instant, 
comprehensive solutions do not exist, only the arduous, painstaking 
path of dialogue, whose multi-textured demands are not beyond the 




Although the argument has been that there is the need to 
urgently move through the dialogue of mind (involving self-
redefinition and identity geared towards mutual understanding rather 
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than conversion); dialogue of life (where real issues of life are 
identified in the dialoguing communities and tackled frankly, boldly 
and courageously) to dialogue of hearts (which depicts mutual 
respect for one another’s religion and the affirmation of life in the 
face of common life-threatening challenges),
60
 it seems to us that if 
any of the stages is impatiently hurried through, the desired effects 
cannot be got because each of the stages is a function of the quantum 
of tolerance displayed. This is the situation in Nigeria and elsewhere. 
As Soyinka expounded above, dialogue requires frankness and 
candour so that teething areas of disagreement can be earnestly 
interrogated. And this requires mature minds that must first and 
foremost be prepared to “unlearn their misinformation”
61
 previously 
held about other people’s religious beliefs. Of course this is where 
the problem lies: realistically open-minded partners, competent in 
their belief and capable of admitting the shortcomings therein with 
integrity on the basis of truth-meeting-truth. 
The point is that frankness requires ‘grace’ to admit that not 
all aspects of a religious belief can pass through the ‘eye’ of 
comparative stage to the superlative. The challenge has been that 
some religious beliefs have jumped the scrutinising sift or filter and 
declared themselves superlative. But if we must not pursue religious 
truth by violence as the world is currently undergoing, which is the 
black spot on Islam, there is the need for this kind of dialogue of 
theology and historicity of religious claims. The urgency of this rests 
on the fact that the “golden age of Islam” was when it stopped its 
spread by jihad and resorted to intellectualism. 
 
They had come out of the Arabian Peninsula in the 
7th century, carrying Islam from Morocco to 
faraway Indonesia. In the process, they overran the 
Byzantine and Persian empires, then crossed the 
Strait of Gibraltar to Iberia, and there they fashioned 
a brilliant civilization that stood as a rebuke to the 
intolerance of the European states to the north. 
Cordoba and Granada were adorned and exalted in 
the Arab imagination. Andalusia brought together 
all that the Arabs favored — poetry, glamorous 
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Ergun and Emir Caner are worth quoting to reassess 
Islam through the eyes of history, and ask frankly as 
didhistorian Bernard Lewis in his 2002 book What 
Went Wrong? 
Baghdad flourished in wealth and scientific 
learning…. Inventions included the clock pendulum, 
the magnetic compass, and algebra. Baghdad had an 
unmatched library that housed writings from 
Aristotle and Plato. In medicine, Muslims were the 
first to use anesthesia in surgery, the first to discover 
that epidemics spread through contact and by air, 
developed the first ambulatory hospital (carried on a 
camel’s back), and separated pharmacology from 
medicine. The energy of Muslim militancy was 




These must challenge both Christians and Muslims to 
reassess themselves in light of contemporary global religious and 
security challenges. While it may be argued that monotheistic 
religions are not less violent than polytheistic ones as demonstrated 
in the interaction between Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and 
Christianity in India, Sri Lanka as well as Pakistan, one can say that 
African Religion particularly in Africa is not as violent as Islam and 
Christianity. This perhaps may result from the fact that it does not 
have a codified sacred text as Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and 
Buddhism, which draw from them to justify violence.
64
A lot of 
insight needs to be drawn from this in genuine dialoguing.  
First, there is a lesson to learn from African Christianity. 
Rather than take up arms physically against the Amorites, Jebusites, 
etc. they perceive them as spiritual forces militating against their 
lives. So they pray for deliverance from these wicked powers and 
principalities. What is suggestive here is that instead of resorting to 
physical violence Christians and Muslims as well as other adherents 
of various religions should interact with their scriptures from this 
perspective. As Adrian Pabst captures it, 




Both Islam and Christianity must first and foremost 
call for a restoration of limits on violence and war. 
To this effect they must repudiate all those traditions 
which sanctify the indiscriminate violence of war 
without limits. Muslims cannot tolerate or excuse 
those who wage offensive jihad and commit suicide 




Second, what follows immediately is that such dialogue 
must repudiate the assumption of what we may call ‘human 
omnipotence,’ in which adherents believe and behave as if they have 
power over life and death, thus killing in the name of God. The idea 
this conveys is that a God who needs to be fought for or defended by 
human arms is less than an omnipotent one in the true sense of the 
word. To assume religious extremism clothed in the garb of 
martyrdom or honour-killing is not only explicitly blasphemous 
against an omnipotent God but also justice and love such a God 
necessarily should represent.
66
 Intra- and inter- theological dialogues 
should be called in this direction. 
Third, genuine dialogue should entail a reassessment of the 
real life issues that confront the people. The following question is 
relevant: how have the governments headed by some Muslims and 
Christians benefited the Muslim and Christian masses, apart from 
the psychological satisfaction that a person belonging to one’s 
religion is at the helms of affairs? The core probing here is that the 
supposed ‘notoriety’ and ‘incurability’ of religiosity is more 
negatively demonstrated, especially in Africa.  
Fourth, to what visible extent has Nigeria’s foreign relations 
with the Arab and Western worlds helped to ameliorate the suffering 
of the Nigerian masses? This is pertinent because Muslims and 
Christians react to what happens outside Nigeria in the country 
sometimes violently against the innocent people. The question is: 
what has affiliation with Arab world done to ameliorate the plight of 
the well over seven million almajirai in northern Nigeria
67
whose 
destiny hangs on the balance or the West to the predicament of the 
Christian poor? One dare suggests that there is the need to mobilise 
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Christians and Muslims for social action against the common 
enemies of the masses, e.g. corruption, poverty, ignorance, disease, 
mortality rate, etc.  
Fifth, both Christians and Muslims should courageously face 
the fact that their faiths have some irreconcilable areas even though 
they reach the depth of their being. Frankly, dialogue cannot resolve 
such deep theological differences that history has already stamped 
on each religion. But dialogue can make everyone free to propagate 
his/her faith in a pluralistic society. The freedom of religious belief 
as prescribed by a constitution confers on all citizens to pursue their 
belief without let. To restrain the Christians by constant attacks (as 
being done in northern Nigeria, for instance) does not only portray 
the attackers in bad light but also appears to go the way of human 
omnipotence, which in all ramifications is a by-product of religious 
intolerance and impotence of a divinity. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that tolerance is a problematic concept in theory and 
practice. Intolerance, which is widely acclaimed to be its opposite, is 
less problematic because of the fact that it can be easily deployed 
physically. In the case of tolerance, the acceptance or rejection of the 
validity of another’s religious claims lies deeply in the mind, the 
psyche. Even though it may not readily result in violence as in 
intolerance, the prejudice that it evokes makes it potentially prone to 
violence. This is because it hinges on the fact of authorisation: one 
allowing or disallowing the other from holding some religious belief. 
The fact of authority in tolerance, even from its pristine 
conceptualisation, ‘burden bearing’ makes tolerance, even in its 
positive stride weak in both theory and praxis. The nature of 
religious truth cannot be scientifically processed by the dint of 
tolerance because of ‘rigging’ it from comparative to superlative 
level. This can only be achieved through the gristmill of dialogue, 
which periscope is to condescend to understand one another’s truth. 
The fore-going does not actually solve the deep theological 
differences between religious claims. But an honest seeker of truth 
would appreciate that historicity of scriptures should not be based on 
democracy but by the truth-content of particular religions. For 
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instance, if Christ fulfilled the Old Testament prophecies concerning 
him, he does not point to the future for further fulfilment. He is 
fulfilment-personified demonstrably observed in the Christ’s events. 
If the Jews await the Messiah, it does not vitiate Christ’s fulfilment 
of the prophecies concerning him. But if Muslims view Christ as a 
prophet rather than a saviour, then the Old Testament, which they all 
subscribe to, becomes the judge. This actually requires an objective, 
dispassionate and honest approach. It is here that we can proceed to 
view the future Schirrmacher so passionately talks about, i.e. on the 
basis of truth-meeting-truth. 
 
*Igboin O. Benson, Department of Religion & African Culture, 
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